To date, little is known about how social context cues influence the processing of information about relations between people, as opposed to information about indidvidual persons. This research addresses the construction of mental clique representations from pairwise sympathy relations. Forty-one participants learned 4 patterns of mutual liking or disliking relations . Patterns were ambiguous in the sense that they allowed integration into either a 2-clique or a 3-clique mental model. Prior to learning each pattern , participants read a story in which a social context was made salient. The context consisted of either 2 or 3 factions , or parties. Participants with good memory for the learned sentiment structure showed evidence for model-based retrieval, and they tended to construct their mental models in line with the context implications. For these participants, specific cues from the social environment influenced how they perceived and recalled interpersonal relationships . Participants with poor memory did not show evidence for mental model construction, but tended to follow a more detail-based memorization process. Context influences were not visible in this group.
To date, little is known about how social context cues influence the processing of information about relations between people, as opposed to information about indidvidual persons. This research addresses the construction of mental clique representations from pairwise sympathy relations. Forty-one participants learned 4 patterns of mutual liking or disliking relations . Patterns were ambiguous in the sense that they allowed integration into either a 2-clique or a 3-clique mental model. Prior to learning each pattern , participants read a story in which a social context was made salient. The context consisted of either 2 or 3 factions , or parties. Participants with good memory for the learned sentiment structure showed evidence for model-based retrieval, and they tended to construct their mental models in line with the context implications. For these participants, specific cues from the social environment influenced how they perceived and recalled interpersonal relationships . Participants with poor memory did not show evidence for mental model construction, but tended to follow a more detail-based memorization process. Context influences were not visible in this group.
Social context can influence judgment and memory in many ways. In social psychology and social cognition, context influences have been conceptualized from different perspectives. In research on eyewitness memory, for example, the general assumption is that context partly determines the quality of a memory trace, the retrieval of which is later facilitated by reinstating the context by appropriate cues (Chandler & Fisher, 1996; Thomson & Tulving, 1970) . The kind of inferences or presuppositions we draw from or apply to heard speech in conversation have been hypothesized to be guided by a set of higher level assumptions about the social context in which they take place (Hilton , 1995) . Perceivers have been shown to reinterpret verbal insults or compliments in the light of prior knowledge about the interactants' relationship (Slugoski & Turnbull , 1988) . In research on attribution , context knowledge has been found to determine the perception of ambiguous behavior. Specifically, situational demands appear to direct processes of early identification and further inference (Trope & Gaunt, 1999) . For example, in conflict situations, direct eye contact, close physical proximity, or even a smile are likely to be perceived in a hostile sense. Such contextual inducements, as it is argued, may occur unconsciously and may determine even at later stages of processing whether situational constraints will be taken into account in order to reduce an initial dispositional attribution. In mediation analyses, indirect effects of situational demands on attitude attributions via assimilative behavior identification have been shown to increase with behavioral ambiguity (Trope & Alfieri , 1997) . The common featu re of all these find ings from different theoretical backgrounds is that social context helps to disambiguate detail information that otherwise remains ambiguous .
Most theoretical frameworks view context as a force or frame influencing the perception and understanding of some target features, or observed individual target behaviors. That is, the object of perception and understanding is usually assumed to be an individual person. In contrast, surprisingly little is known about the ways in which context may affect the perception and understanding of genuinely relational information, that is, information about the nature of links and bonds between several individual others. Of course, processes of how people perceive patterns of sentiment relations within groups of their environment have been investigated since the early days of social cognition (Heider, 1958) and the field has remained active since then (e. g., Freeman, 1992; Hummert, Crockett, & Kemper, 1990) . But little is known so far about how specific context information interacts with the processing of more complex patterns of relations. It is however important to know more about the interplay between context factors and cognition in this case, since in many situations of everyday life, when starting a new job , moving to another city, and making new friends, one of the main cognitive tasks a perceiver has to deal with is to get an orientation within these new social environments, and to find a position for oneself given the structure of groups and cliques that one is placed within. The present research examines precisely how context variables may guide the cognitive processes involved in th is orientation step.
As a principle of cognitive organization, rules of social inference (Hastie & Carlston, 1980) have been shown to operate when we perceive and memorize patterns of sentiment relations. Specifically, by the rule of antitransitivityone may infer that my enemy's enemy is my friend (Aronson & Cope, 1968) ; by the rule of transitivity one may infer that my friend's friend is also my friend, or my enemy's enemy is also my enemy (Crockett, 1982) . Most of the existing work has exclusively focused on the quality of memory representations and on retrieval processes with respect to relational information (e.g., Picek, Sherman, & Shiffrin, 1975; Sent is & Burnstein, 1979) . Less attention was given until recently (but see von Hecker, Crockett, Hummert, & Kemper, 1996) to the question of how social background knowledge can influence the perception of relations and the activation of inferential rules. In conceptualizing such context influences, it is proposed here that cues from the context serve to activate or deactivate inferential rules that will determine guidelines for processing further input. This suggestion is germane to a conceptual distinction made earlier by Taylor and Crocker (1981) who distinguished content-specific social schemas from inferential rules. They assumed that "rules such as balance, reciprocity, and causation may apply to certain content-specific schemas (e.g., attributes of a friendship group are balance and reciprocity), and they may help to structure incoming data" (p. 92). Specifically, when the input is ambiguous, the processing steps applied to this input may depend on the context in which it is presented, given that the context provides applicable cues. This argument is also germane to the position taken by Higgins and King (1981) on the question of context-specific accessibility of social constructs, when they state that situation-specific expectancies are likely to yield specific steps of active processing. It is suggested here that a salient social context provides cues that trigger the cognitive rearrangement and integration of multiple dyadic sentiment relations into a unified, coherent mental model. As a first and simple approach, such models are thought to represent mutual liking by common membership in one and the same so-called mental clique (Hummert et aI., 1990 , von Hecker, 1997 . Different cliques are, in turn, exclusively linked by mutual disliking. The integrative process of forming cliques in memory is located here within a molar, effortful stage of information processing which seems vulnerable to a lack of resources in working memory (von Hecker & Sedek, 1999) . Based on earlier studies (von Hecker, 1997) , it is assumed that clique construction is based on the application of social inference rules such as antitransitivity or transitivity. It is further stipulated that the salient context determines which one of these rules will be used for model construction.
The Experimental Setting
To see how inference rules can be used in order to construct mental clique models from learned sentiment relations , imagine a fictitious set of sentiment patterns such as depicted in Figure 1 . Such sets are to be learned one relation after another, with the instruction of forming an impression about the overall group structure. Given the ambiguous structure in Figure 1, Figure 1 in light of context information about a social conflict among two vs. three factions or parties, it is likely that the context will function as a cue to what type of construction rule should be applied in order to arrive at an integrated mental model. Thereby, as one may hypothesize, the given pattern will be disambiguated.
Hypotheses
In the present study, stimulus materials are used that do not specify the nature of the BF link. As such, each learned sentiment structure is left ambiguous as to the number of cliques . A context story is provided for each learned structure that makes sal ient a social conflict situation, entailing either two or three factions or parties. The context by itself does not mention the party affiliations of the fictitious individuals between whom relations are to be learned. Thus, the "two··clique" vs. "three-clique" implication to be derived from the context is th e only cue for the later processing of the dyadic sentiment relations.
When learning a pattern such as Figure 1 , participants should attempt to construct a mental model and to solve the ambiguity in the pattern by using the context as a cue. Specifically, when the context implies two cliques, they should tend to apply antitransitivity to BO and OF, as well as to AC and CE , thereby inferring positive critical links between BF, AE , AF, and BE as part of their model, and resulting in two cliques (ABEF vs. CD). In contrast, when the context implies three cliques, they should tend to apply the rule of transitivity to BO and OF, thereby inferring negative critical links as part of their model, resulting in a three-clique overall model (AB vs. CD vs. EF). In addition to hypotheses about critical links, it is possible to predict, in line with cognitive balance theory (Heider, 1958) , some further effects of integrative model construction. Within Figu re 1, all relations of the type AD, BC, CF, and DE should be inferred to be of negative value, since the clique assumptions as spelled out above also imply cognitive balance (for a discussion see Hummert et aI., 1990) . Such relations are referred to as partial links as they are not critical with respect to the overall quality of the hypothesized model , but cover just parts of it (e.g., the triad ABO).
The observation of these constructive phenomena should be conditional to a sufficient learning of the presented pattern ( Figure 1 ). Only to the extent that participants have spent sulficient effort in learning and thus have a clear representation of the relational pattern as presented , can they be expected also to have carried out inferential operations of the nature hypothesized here, as balance, antitransitivity and transitivity inferences should go along with a clear representation of antecedent cond itions. Quality of learning will be assessed by testing the retention of the originally presented stimulus materials (Figure 1 ). Study time will be measured to assess the amount of effort put into the study of individual relations during the learning stage.
Method

PartiCipants
Forty-one students enrolled in psychology or education at the University of Potsdam where the author was affiliated at that time, partiCipated in the experiment (6 male, 35 female) . In case of psychology students, participation was acknowledged as partial fulfilment of the experimental session requirement for all psychology students at the University of Potsdam. All other students received DM 15 for their participation (DM = German Mark, approximately US $6.75).
Materials
Type of structure. Four patterns of fictitious social relations of the type illustrated in Figure 1 were constructed. Each consisted of six names and seven sentiment relations. In Figure 1 , capital letters represent German first names; straight lines between names symbolize mutual positive sentiment relations, dashed lines symbolize mutual negative sentiment relations. Within each pattern, only names of the same gender were used. Two structures had female names, the others had male names.
Each individual sentiment relation was presented on a computer screen in normal size ASCII characters. Plus and minus signs were used between two names to symbolize the sentiment value of the particular relation.
Context stories. Four different topics were chosen to represent a diversity of social settings while at the same time being of sufficient relevance and salience to the majority of students on campus. The chosen topics concerned (a) an environmental debate, (b) students' funding by state money, (c) the organization of a neighborhood day care, and (d) a debate on school traffic regulations. As an example, the story about the environmental debate reads as follows (the stories were originally in German):
In a small town there has been a lasting debate between environmentalists on the one hand and the managers of company X on the other hand. Several members of both sides, A, B, C, D, E, and F (German first names) , have promised to meet in the city hall in order to find a solution to the conflict. The cause of the debate are waste waters that the company disposes of by introducing them into a nearby river. The environmentalists hold the opinion that those waste waters are poisonous and therefore must first be processed. They maintain that the substances have already caused severe damage to animals and plants living in that area. They say they will hold sit-ins and demonstrations on company grounds if the company does not cease dumping immediately. The company managers, on the other hand, claim that the waste waters are absolutely non-toxical. Therefore, they are not at all ready to change their present procedures. They further maintain that engaging in efforts to process those substances would entail unbearably high costs.
For all four context scenarios, two parallel forms of approximately equal length were constructed. One of them implied two cliques or factions in a conflict as does, for example, the above story. The other one implied three such cliques. For example, the three-clique version of the above context story read as follows:
In a small town there has been a lasting debate between environmentalists as one party, the managers of company X as the second party, and members of a neighborhood initiative, as the third party. Several members of all three sides , A, B, C, D, E, and F (German first names), have promised to meet in the city hall in order to find a solution to the conflict. The cause of the debate are waste waters that the company disposes of by introducing them into a nearby river. The environmentalists demand that those poisonous waste waters must be processed before dumping. The company managers, on the other hand, claim that the waste waters are absolutely non-toxical and that they are not at all ready to change their present procedures because of high costs. The members of the neighborhood initiative definitely do not want the waste waters to be introduced into the river. However, they strictly oppose the environmentalists' position that they think is overblown. They think that these people will only bring trouble to the community.
Note that, although the six names were always mentioned in a paragraph, no connection was made between any of the names and which side of the conflict they were on. Neither did the context paragraph contain any statement about interpersonal relations. The context paragraph did however convey the notion about whether a two-clique or a three-clique situation should be imagined (see the very first sentences in the two paragraphs above). All stories were of approximately the same length. In constructing the three-clique versions, care was taken to ensure that opposing views became clearly apparent between all three pairs of different factions.
Design
All experimental factors were manipulated as within-participants factors. Each participant viewed four different sets of relations in random order, half of them implying two, half of them implying three social cliques or factions. Counterbalancing was such that across the sample each contextual content was presented equally often in a two-clique story as it was in a three-clique story. Each context story was assigned one of four different name sets (two female, two male) in a systematic way across the sample to ensure equal assignment between name gender, story content, and clique implication.
Procedure
Participants were given a written instruction sheet, explaining that they were participating in a study on the perception of and memory for social relations in small groups. They were told that the task consisted of four blocks and that in each block there were three stages: (a) Reading a story, (b) learning a number of sentiment relations, and (c) recognizing the learneo information. Blocks were divided by a buffer task. Participants were told that the materials between blocks were unrelated as for the main task, but at the end, there would be a final test in which one would have to reassign each name across all blocks to the block-specific context in which the name had occurred. This latter test was done to maintain rehearsal of context contents throughout the experiment. Thus, participants had to deal with two simultaneous tasks, one within blocks (learning of sentiment relations) and one across blocks (learning of namecontext assignments). Instructions explained that the context stories were being given only as part of the name-context assignment task, and that they had no further relation to the sentiment-learning task.
Prior to conducting the four blocks, participants were given practice trials for the procedures of the stages (1) -(3) .
Story reading. The story paragraph was presented on the screen for a 1.S-minute study period. The six names appeared in highlighted mode on a separate line, but syntactically embedded in the story.
Learning of relations. The seven relations were presented in random order, one after another as a descending list on the screen. A participant could view each of them at her/his own pace, pressing the space bar each time to proceed to the next one. Upon pressing the space bar, the relation sign (plus or minus) between the two names was erased from the relation just studied, leaving the names on the screen, and the next complete relation appeared directly below. The task Was to memorize each relation while integrating it into a common picture about the overall sympathy structure among the persons known so far.
Recognition. Upon learning a set of relations, participants were presented with a random series of recognition items, shown individually in the center of the screen. The series contained six relations that had been learned, called explicit items. Explicit items were all three positive relations, and a random selection of three out of the four presented negative relations. The series further contained six relations that could be inferred, called implicit items. These were all four critical links, as well as a random selection of two out of the four partial links. Among all tested relations, some were always presented with a positive sign whereas others were presented with a negative sign. Assignment of signs to pairs was random, with the restriction that (1) there had to be equal numbers (three) of positive and negative signs in both categories of explicit and implicit test relations, and that (2) within implicit test relations, two critical links and one partial link had to be of either sentiment value. The instruction was to respond as fast and as accurately as possible, using three response options: (1) "Not mentioned," which should mean that a relation between these two names had not been shown during the learning stage; (2) "True," meaning that the information on the screen, that is, name pair and relation sign, corresponded exactly to one of the relations seen in the learning stage; and (3) "False," meaning that the pair itself had been shown, but that the relation sign was wrong. Type of response as well as latency were recorded for each recognition item.
Buffer task. To clear participants' working memory from the names and relations of the preceding block, a word finding task was administered in between the experimental blocks. Participants were prompted a color word, for example, "blue," and were asked to be creative, to come up with as many objects they could think of in a short time which were of that color, and to type them in for a 40-s period.
After the four sequential stages had been repeated for four blocks, the final check-up on the name-story assignment was administered. All 24 names appeared on the screen individually, in random order. For each name, the participant had to select between four options denoting the four main topics of the stories (environment, student funding, day care, school traffic).
Finally, participants were debriefed and paid. Sessions were conducted in small groups from 1 to 3 persons and lasted about 50 minutes.
Results
Preparatory Analyses
The first preliminary question concerned the quality of overall retention of six explicit items from the learning stage, that is, the three positive links between A and S, C and D, E and F, and three randomly selected from the four negative links (cf. Figure 1 ). All correctly recognized explicit relations were summed across all four blocks for each partiCipant, yielding a score from 0 to 24. The overall sample was medianized into two subsamples. Two participants were excluded because they exhibited the exact median value. The remaining participants were divided into high memory (N = 20) and low memory (N = 19) participants (see Table 1 ). This partition was done to test whether the evidence for context influences on the construction of cliques would depend on the quality of learning the initial materials. 1 When tested against the fixed parameter under random guessing (12 correct 18ecause the partition into a high and a low group creates a quasi-experimental categorization, one should keep in mind that the direction of influence between the grouping variable and any dependent measure cannot be establislled . That is, it cannot be determined whether, for example, high learning performance causes the context to have an impact. Rather, as outlined above, high learning performance and evidence for context influence should co-occur. responses) , the high group showed clear above-chance performance (M = 18.35, SO = 2.81), t (19) = 10.09; P < .001, whereas the low group performed at chance level (M = 11.57, SO = 2.75), t (18) = -0.67; ns. The low group also performed worse when names had to be reassigned to contexts, t (37) = -2.18; P < .04, Cohen's d = .71.
Prior to assessing the correctness of the displayed relation sign, participants had to make a decision whether the relation displayed was an old one, that is, had been shown during the learning stage, or a new one, that is, a distractor. If they had not seen it before, they had to select "not mentioned" as the correct response. Therefore, more or less conservative guessing strategies in making this "old ;"s. new" decision could have influenced the score on which the distinction into high and low groups was based. To assess this possibility, a proportion of hits minus proportion of false alarms difference score was calculated for each participant, analogous to the recognition parameter in a two-high-threshold model of recognition memory (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988; see Meiser & Broder, 2002 , for a discussion of two-high-threshold and related models). Across all four experimental blocks, the proportion of relations among implicit items that were judged as true or false (instead of the correct rejection, not mentioned) was subtracted from the proportion of relations among explicit items that were judged as either true or false. The mean difference scores (and standard deviations) in the two groups were high: .48 (.28) and low: .25 (.19), with highs showing better recognition accuracy than lows, t (37) = -2.88; P < .01, Cohen's d = .96. To conclude from this, the group distinction in terms of correctly recognized explicit relations seems also to have validity in terms of an accuracy measure corrected for the "old vs. new" guessing bias.
To further validate the high vs. low distinction, individual median study times spent at all relations across all four blocks were compared between groups. It was found that high participants spent longer (M = 12720 ms, SO = 7394 ms) looking at individual relations than low participants did (M = 9476 ms, SO = 4001 ms), t (37) = -1.69; P < .05, one-tailed, Cohen's d = .55.
Frequency of Intrusions
An intrusion was defined as any response during the recognition stage which, upon an implicit relation query, deviated from the correct response (not mentioned). The six implicit recognition items consisted of all four critical links as well as a random selection of two out of the four partial links (see Figure 1) . Proportions of such erroneous responses among all recognition responses to those types of links were analyzed as a function of group (high vs. low) and type of link (partial vs. critical).2 The 21ntrusions were analyzed as proportions rather than absolute numbers to make possible comparisons between critical and partial links, as these had been tested with different numbers of items per block (four critical links, but only two partial links) . In terms of absolute frequencies , the average numbers of intrusions made in the high versus low group were, at critical links (Standard Deviations in brackets): 5.50 (4.03) vs. 7.68 (3.32) , and at partial links 3.35 (2.41) vs. 4.42 (2.12). For each participants, intrusions were summed across all experimental blocks.
analysis of variance revealed a difference between critical (M = .41, SO = .23) and partial (M = .50, SO = .27) links as the only significant effect, F (1, 36)3 = 6.87; P < .02.
Main Hypothesis: Critical Links
The central hypothesis states that the construction of a clique model from sentiment relations is disambiguated by social context information. Disambiguation is assessed in the present data by looking at the percentage of those intrusions among all intrusions made at critical links, that are consistent with the hypothesized mental model. The percentage of such model-consistent critical intrusions was calculated across all four experimental blocks. As it turned out, critical intrusions committed by high participants were more strongly biased towards the hypothesized model (M = .63, SO = .27) than were intrusions committed by low participants (M = .48, SO = .19), t (34) = -1.83; p < .03 , one-tailed, Cohen's d = .63. The proportion displayed by highs was significantly larger than .50, t (16) = 1.95; P < .03, one-tailed. The predicted context influence on the disambiguation of critical links was therefore clearly visible for participants who also demonstrated substantial memory for the initial learning materials. It was not observed for partiCipants who could remember these materials only rather poorly.
Additional Analyses
Partial links. As a further prediction from cognitive balance theory (Heider, 1958) , intrusions made at queries on partial links should show a specific pattern. That is, as part of an integrated clique model, relations between persons, for example, A and D, or C and F (see Figure 1) , should be of negative value, regardless of type of model. Intrusions should therefore be biased to reflect negative sentiment. That is, responses to a name pair representing a partial link should be eiither false when that pair was prompted with a plus sign, or true when prompted with a minus sign. In line with these stipulated effects, intrusion coefficients Significantly larger than 0.5 were obtained, not only for high-(M = .84, SO = .20) ~11) = 5.65; P < .001, but also for low-memory participants (M = .65, SO = .26) ~16) = 2.38; P < .03, but lows showed less of this bias than highs did, ~27) = -2.06; P < .05, Cohen'S d = .81.
Additional evidence for model-based retrieval. Response times in the recognition phase were analyzed to obtain independent evidence on model-based retrieval. If responses to implicit rE!cognition items (critical and partial links) are made based on inference processes at the time of the query, latencies for that type of relation should be longer than the latencies shown at retrieval of explicit recognition items. Model-based retrieval however would imply no differences between these types of latencies (Hummert et aI., 1990) . Figure 2 shows the response latencies obtained in the two groups, for explicit versus implicit relations. To assess 3Degrees of freedom are reduced compared with Table 1 here and in further analyses in cases where some participants did not commit any intrusions at all. the above prediction, the across-blocks average latency value of each participant for explicit relations was subtracted from their across-blocks average latency value for implicit relations. These mean differences were, for each group, high: 55 ms (SO= 2850), and low: 1296 ms (SO= 1451).
The latter value is significantly different from zero, t (18) = 3.89; P < .001, as well as different from the value in the high group, t (37) = 1.70; P < .04, one-tailed, Cohen's d = .54.
Discussion
The main finding and the main suggestion of this study can be summarized in two statements. Learning about the existence of liking or disliking relations between our new colleagues, fellow students, teammates, or sports friends is important in order to generate an overall picture of the whole group , and to eventually find ourselves an adequate position in the group. The present research has shown that context implications may guide the processes of constructing a coherent mental model of the social environment in the light of missing information about certain pairs of mutual liking. It seems a realistic assumption that in most cases when we try to construct such models in new social environments, not all pairwise information will in fact be available.
It seems that a context with a relevant implication can induce bias to the resulting clique structure that one builds up from the perceived single relations between people. In the present study, ambiguous materials were used that made it possible to observe p, erceivers' tendencies to supplement their mental models. Perceivers seem to clarify an ambiguous relational structure in terms of substituting missing links. The group that shows the predicted effects of disambiguation (the high group) is also the group that shows the clearest independent evidence for model construction . That is, in the high group there are the smallest differences between latencies obtained for explicit and implicit queries in the recognition phase. If retrieval is based on a mental model, this is what one should expect (Hummert et aI., 1990) . Such evidence, therefore, supports the conclusion that participants in the high group were in fact constructing mental clique models from the sentiment relations . In contrast, the latencies in the low group do not support such a conclusion. This group needed more than 1 second longer on average to answer queries on implicit relations than they needed to answer explicit relations. This pattern is consistent with the assumption of inference processes taking place at the time of the query. Presumably, mental models in the low group were at best weakly constructed. Because the distinction between highs and lows in the present study may act as a proxy for a distinction in terms of working memory capacity, the · present data have implications for the issue of how low working memory capacity may constitute a limiting factor for higher level intellectual processes in the social domain. Tasks tllat require the inference of new elements of knowledge, as well as integrative thinking, are likely to be most affected. Individuals with less working memory resources have been shown to perform worse than those with more working memory resources on inductive reasoning tasks such as number series completion (Holzmann, Pellegrino, & Glaser, 1983 ; see also Jurden, 1995) , they are likely to exhibit less complex self-representations (Conway & White-Dysart, 1999) and less complex representations about the emotions of others (Conway, 2000) than their counterparts with more working memory resources. It seems therefore that low working memory capacity may generally interfere with effortful, more complex tasks (Hasher & Zacks, 1979) , and the present study is consistent with the idea that individuals with less working memory resources may be particularly disadvantaged when it comes to constructing social mental models (for a similar argument with respect to cognitive impairments seen in dysphoria, see von Hecker & Sedek, 1999) .
Cognitive researchers have emphasized that, in general, context information is not only useful but needed in guiding the construction of a mental model (Brewer, 1987; Greeno, 1989) . In social cognition, context influences have not yet been explicitely linked to the process of mental model construction. But classic work on the schematic bases of social information processing (e.g., Taylor & Crocker, 1981) does entail the notion of inferential rules helping to structure the mulitplicity of observed information. In this respect, the present data show strong evidence for rules based on transitivity/ antitransitivity (operating on negative relations, when substituting critical links), but also for the operation of cognitive balance in general (when substituting partial links).4
Assuming that inferential rules are used to construct mental models, the question arises what activates a certain rule to become a salient principle in a given situation. As other researchers have argued, the social context creates expectancies about the structural rules that appear valid, given that context. For example, hierarchies of asymmetrical influence relations were more easily learned when the names denoted officers of different ranks than when they denoted officers of the same rank (Van Kreveld & Zajonc, 1966) . In this case, an expectancy about asymmetry as an applicable rule facilitated learning of rule-consistent materials. Expectancy has remained a key concept in explaining determinants of construct accessibility (e.g., Higgins, 2000; Higgins & King, 1981 ). An early related result can be found in Kelley's (1950) study on labeling effects on impression formation where students' ratings of a new instructor varied as a function of prior information about him as a "warm" or "cold" person. In influencing construct accessibility, expectancy as derived from context is distinct from other potentially influential factors such as motivation or unconscious priming. Neither of the latter two applies to the present study because the context manipulation did not involve motivational factors and perception was clearly above threshold. Thus, expectancy, as interpreted in the light of the present findings, can be assumed to operate during resource-demanding stages of information processing, such as conceptual integration and generative thinking.
The present research demonstrates for the first time that social contexts can help disambiguate patterns of detail information concerning the structure of interpersonal relations. At a soccer game, relations between people may be more readily processed in terms of "we" against "them," or ''Team A" against "Team B," than at a political discussion where representatives of multiple parties contest for voters. In the first case, one might find oneself more framed for a two-clique world than in the latter case, where one would expect a more complex, multiple-clique environment (von Hecker, 1997) . Such expectancies, as they are produced by salient context cues, can have an influence on inferences about dyadic sympathy relations between target people, as viewed within one and the same context.
The present stimulus materials were ambiguous and as such can be assumed to create uncertainty in the participants as to the valid clique 4As a limitation of the present research, it must be noted that the sample was only 15% male. Given mostly gender-role based differences between females and males in social behavior (Durkin , 1995) , and findings about slightly greater sensitivity among females for social perceptual stimuli (Otta, Lira, Delevati , Cesar, & Pires, 1994) , it may be the case that females perform differently from males in the task used, or that the influence of context on model construction is moderated by gender. Thus, the reported findings may not fully generalize to male samples or to a sample more evenly composed of both sexes. structure. Situations of subjective uncertainty, as Klauer, Musch, and Naumer (2000) suggest, are ones in which reasoners may rely more on peripheral cues, such as context information. If there is an applicable cue, such as a clique implication, a corresponding inferential rule may be triggered as part of the reasoning stage in which working memory contents are being integrated into a more comprehensive model (Johnson-Laird, 1983) . These integrative steps of thinking may depend crucially on the quality of the available informational basis in memory. As discussed above, the comparison between high and low memory groups in this study suggests that low participants' memories of the seven presented relations were not precise enough to support a successful model construction. Lows were also shown to have spent less effort at learning those materials. These participants, however, did show some degree of balance-consistent responding at partial links, although to a lesser degree than highs did. This is consistent with the assumption that low participants' memory representations were weaker, such that even a limited application of the balance rule (as applied to only substructures of tile relational pattern) was not as visible for them as it was for the high group.
Further research should more systematically address different ways in which context cues may activate or deactivate specific inferential rules in processes of social perception. Social contexts contain diagnostic information that perceivers may use in order to disambiguate and structure their interpersonal environments. Ttle usefulness of such diagnostic cues, as far as constructive processes are concerned , may depend on the amount of cognitive resources devoted to the perception task as part of the ongoing cognitive activity.
